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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________
No. 07-4501
_________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
JONATHAN SAINT PREUX,
Appellant
___________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey 
06-cr-00813-1
(Honorable Katharine S. Hayden, U.S. District Judge) 
__________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on April 16, 2009
Before: McKEE, SMITH, and 
VAN ANTWERPEN,  Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 24, 2009) 
OPINION OF THE COURT
McKEE, Circuit Judge
Jonathan Saint Preux  appeals the sentence of 57 months imprisonment followed by two
years of supervised release that was entered following his guilty plea.  For the reasons that
2follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, it is not necessary to recite the facts or history
of this case except as may be helpful to our brief discussion.  Saint Preux pled guilty pursuant to
a plea agreement to submitting false immigration documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a),
and the government agreed to dismiss the remaining seven counts of the indictment in return. 
The plea agreement between the parties set forth that Saint Preux’s base offense level was 11,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1.  The parties stipulated that his base offense level should be
increased: (1) nine levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1(b)(2)(c) because the offense involved
more than 100 documents; (2) two levels because Saint Preux was the organizer, leader, manager
and supervisor in a criminal activity pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c); and (3) two levels because
Saint Preux both abused a position of private trust and used a special skill in a manner that
significantly facilitated the commission and concealmenet of the offense pursuant to U.S.S.G.
3B1.3.  That total offense level was subject to reduction based on the following clause of the plea
agreement: 
If defendant Jonathan Saint Preux enters a plea pursuant to this agreement and qualifies
for a 2-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a),
and if in addition defendant Jonathan Saint Preux’s offense level under the Guidelines
prior to the operation on § 3E1.1(a) is 16 or greater, defendant Jonathan Saint Preux will
be entitled to a further one-point reduction in his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
3E1.1(b).
App. 35. 
 The district court found that with a total offense level of 24 and Criminal History
category of I, Saint Preux fell within the advisory range of 51 to 63 months imprisonment, and
3imposed a sentence of 57 months imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release. 
Saint Preux now challenges the district court’s refusal to reduce his guideline offense level by
three levels based on his acceptance of responsibility, as stipulated in the plea agreement. 
II. 
Saint Preux has the burden of establishing that he is entitled to a three level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility by a preponderance of the evidence.  United States v. Boone, 279
F.3d 163, 193 (3d Cir. 2002).  The district court’s denial of the three point reduction is entitled to
“great deference” because “the sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s
acceptance of responsibility.”  Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), App. Note 5).  
We review factual findings “underlying the denial of a Sentencing Guidelines reduction
for acceptance of responsibility for clear error, and reverse only if we are left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 199
(3d Cir. 2007) (citing Boone, 279 F.3d at 193; United States v. Felton, 55 F.3d 861, 864 (3d Cir.
1995)). 
Saint Preux acknowledges that the “law imposes a formidable burden” on his appeal. 
Appellant’s  Br. at 24.  He nevertheless argues that he can satisfy the burden because of  the
terms of the plea agreement even though he nevertheless admits that the written agreement does
not promise a three point reduction on its face.  Moreover, Saint Preux’s reliance on the terms of
the plea agreement ignore the provisions of Application Note 3 to U.S.S.G § 3E1.1 which states
that a “defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment under this section as a
matter of right.”  
Saint Preux argues that he fully admitted his wrongdoing, gave at least three proffers to
4the government and even offered to testify against one of his co-conspirators at trial.  Appellant’s
Br. at 27.  The government, however, points to portions of Saint Preux’s testimony both before
and during the sentencing hearing that purportedly reflect a lack of remorse and lack of
responsibility.  For example, at the sentencing hearing, Saint Preux stated that “I did plead guilty,
your Honor, but not knowingly, not freely”; “The next day I go to my office because I knew I did
not do anything wrong”; and then finally, “I didn’t sign those applications... [i]t is not even close
to my signature.”  App. 92, 96, 102-03.  
Although Saint Preux clearly had a right to plead not guilty and force the government to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, he elected to plead guilty in return for the benefits
offered in the plea agreement.  However, in doing so, he attempted to plead guilty without
admitting guilt.  In denying three points for acceptance of responsibility, the court emphasized
Saint Preux’s statements to the Probation Office.  Saint Preux denied signing all of the fraudulent
applications, claiming that Patel, a co-defendant, had forged his signature on over 400 of the
applications.  Pre-Sentencing Report at 32, ¶ 102.  Saint Preux also told the Probation Office that
the “government doesn’t have the resources to go after the applicants.  So they go after the
attorneys.” Id. at 33, ¶ 105.  Saint Preux argues that his statements to Probation should not have
been considered because his attorney was not present for the interview.  That is a frivolous
response.  The absence of his counsel did not preclude the district court from relying on the
statements.  Appellant’s Br. at 28.  
Saint Preux claims that his statement disclaiming responsibility for 400 of the
applications was only a “minor retreat from his previous admission.”  Id. at 28-29.  However, the
size of the retreat need not control how the court views his entitlement to a three point reduction
5for acceptance of responsibility.  The district court was clearly entitled to consider his
equivocations when deciding upon the extent of departure Saint Preux was entitled to based on
his guilty plea.
Similarly, we will not second guess the district court’s view of the apology Saint Preux
finally managed to articulate.  The district court properly weighed these considerations and
concluded that Saint Preux’s guilty plea should not automatically purchase a three level
departure. 
III. 
For all of the above reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to
reduce Saint Preux’s guideline offense level based on his acceptance of responsibility, and will
therefore affirm the district court’s sentence of  57 months to be followed by two years of
supervised release.
                                                                               
